Since the relaxation of social controls triggered by the reform policy，millionsof rural residents have rushed to the cities to find work in factories，sweatshops，construction sites or to open their own shops.They often settled with people oftheir own province on the outskirts of large cities where they rented shacks fromlocal peasants.Peking‘s Zhejiang Village，Xinjiang Village ，Henan Village sprangup in this way.The cover story presented below is about Zhejiang Village ，thelargest one in the capital，which was founded in the mid-eighties and which anevacuation order adopted by the municipality on 10November now threatens to wipeout ……

　　The Destruction of the“Village ”

　　Jean philippe B éja and Michel Bonnin

　　In a light drizzle unusual in Peking for this time of year，they are bangingaway with sledgehammers and hammers at the walls of the little red brick housesthey had put up themselves and where they once lived.Shreds of calendars ，allthat is left of their shattered lives ，hang down from the support walls againstwhich they had built the shelters they had called home for the last few years.Seeminglyoblivious to the heavy blows shaking their own buildings，other residents get onwith their work ，ironing clothes or cutting up leather；young men go past carryingbundles of garments to the market on the other side of the road where crowds ofwell-informed customers from the city are on the look-out for a good bargain.

　　On 15November this year，Zhejiang Village in Fengtai district to the southof Peking ，the capital's ghetto for migrants from the Wenzhou region of Zhejiangprovince，was the subject of an evacuation order -"Notice on the clearance andreconstruction of Dahongmen in Fengtai district"（Guanyu qingli zhengdun FengtaiDahongmen diqu de tonggao ）issued by the municipality of Peking.（The decisionwas taken on 10November）。Under the terms of the order ，unauthorised residentshave fifteen days to leave and illegal constructions（in which the vast majorityof the migrant population lives ）are to be demolished before 30November.Peoplewho built their own houses and wish to keep the building materials have to knockthem down themselves.As the Peking winter is already setting in，destroying thehomes where not only workers but women and children live is a very effective wayof getting rid of them.Smiles this Saturday 18November are a rarety.In the lastfew days foreigners have been prohibited entry to the village and those who didmanage to get in were quickly escorted to the police station where they were informedthat entry was restricted to holders of letters of introduction issued by the city'sPropaganda Department.Today，perhaps because of the new five-day working week ，there are no police about and no one has stopped us from wandering around the demolitionsite.Most of the little houses on either side of the main thoroughfare throughthe village are marked with the character chai（demolish）。Yet inside ，in smallrooms ，young women are still working away at their sewing machines.Other youngwomen ，in make-up ，obviously not seamstresses ，chat to each other as theywait for customers.Right in the middle of the market with its red duck ，spicesand other Wenzhou specialities，two residents are dismantling a few stalls ，butfor most other traders it is business as usual and customers bustle to and fro asif nothing were happening.

　　Life goes on in Zhejiang even as the blows from sledgehammers signal its imminentend.But the cassette sellers have stopped playing their tapes of Wenzhou musicand on the walls there are no plucked ducks hanging up to dry.

　　A self-organised micro-society

　　It was in 1985，right at the start of the great wave of migration from thecountryside to the towns，that the first migrants from Zhejiang province movedinto a village in Fengtai district，at that time quite separate from Peking.Inthe early 1990s ，the population exploded and now stands at 100，000，accordingto the official in charge of the clearance，from the police as it happens（theofficial figure admits to "nearly 40，000"only ）（1）。

　　The Village ，which is in fact a ghetto，consists of five administrative villages，corresponding to 26natural villages.The migrants，mostly from Wenzhou，haveset up numerous garment assembly shops，with leather predominating ，as it doesin their home villages.Their output floods the Peking market.One researcher putstheir share of the market in several products at 40-50%.This goes up to 70%，even80%，in the case of leather jackets ，and 90%for buttons and zippers（2）。Safety standards are certainly far from adequate -ventilation is poor，workinghours long，and rest days infrequent -but the prices are unbeatble and the marketopposite the village attracts crowds of city customers.Over the years the markethas expanded and today is nearly all under cover.

　　As the migrant population grew，it became better organised.The range of servicesincreased ，to include the 700pedicabs（3），the market itself，restaurantsand the bus service between the village and the area around Wenzhou which bringsin load after load of new arrivals.

　　The Wenzhou municipal government has been quick to take an interest in thiscommunity ，liaising with the Fengtai authorities and attempting to exercise somekind of control over its people.But the villagers themselves have set up theirown organisations to defend their interests and protect themselves from the authoritiesand the local population，as well as to ensure a minimum of law and order.Whilesome of the associations are commercial in nature ，like the Ruiyang Traders Guild（Ruiyang hanghui ）or traditional self-help organisations ，some are more Mafia-like.Scams and protection rackets abound and crime ，prostitution and narcotics arepart of the scene -one which the police tend to leave well alone.Official figuresput at 1543the number of criminal and public order offenses committed in the villagein the period January-September 1995，twice as many as last year （4）。

　　In the early days ，the Fengtai district government，which relies on the migrantsfor 40%of its revenues ，was only too pleased to see them set themselves up onits doorstep.In the same way ，the village authorities and the local villagersfelt that fortune was smiling on them.They happily rented out the semi-legal dwellingsbuilt in the aftermath of the Tangshan earthquake in 1976in which city residentshad enjoyed a bit more space for themselves at a time when the per capita livingarea in the capital was a mere two square metres.

　　As the influx continued ，the village（cun ）authorities gave their permissionfor the construction of 40buildings-with-courtyard on village land and signed leaseswith the migrants involved.The migrants were also helped by the authorities intheir home areas.But as no authorisation had been given by the district or municipalauthorities ，the structures are deemed illegal and thus can be legally demolished.There is no disputing the fact that the lanes which criss-cross the village arevery narrow indeed，barely wide enough for one person in some places ，and completelyinaccessible for fire service vehicles.

　　Rumours about the village have been circulating for months.One was that thepolice were scared to go in ，an indication of the state of anarchy prevailingin the village，or rather of self-government by "provincials"，which shocked notonly the authorities but ordinary Peking residents as well.They feel that the increasinginconvenience they are having to put up with，especially in terms of crime andoverloaded public transport ，can be largely attributed to the migrants.Beforethe decision to clear the area had been taken ，the ratio of migrants to localsranged from eight-to-one to five-to-one ，depending on the source used.And asthe migrants speak a dialect local residents cannot understand，suffer a reputationfor harbouring secret societies ，eat differently，and are usually there illegally，they find themselves marginalised by society.For more than two years the papershave been dwelling on the fact that a significant percentage of lawbreakers aremigrants and that they violate family planning regulations -in other words ，theyare a criminally-oriented population.

　　Papers，papers ，papers

　　Under the strictly applied residence regulations in force at the beginning ofthe 1980s ，peasants were forbidden to move into the towns.But as party controlslackened ，and construction and private enterprise in general boomed，the authoritiesin the big cities began to turn a blind eye to the influx.They even issued temporaryresidence （hukou ）permits to migrants to keep them on the right side of the law.But the high concentration of migrant populations in ghettos on the outskirts ofthe city has always been a source of concern for the city authorities in Peking.Unsuccessful attempts to clean up the village had been made in 1989，in 1990andin 1993，when Peking was a candidate for the 2000Olympic games.But obtaininga temporary residence permit has been made much more difficult and today any peasantwho wants to move in legally must not only have an identity document but also anexternal work permit（waichu dagong zheng ），an employment certificate（jiuyezheng ），a temporary residence permit （zanzhu zheng），and a family planningcertificate （jihua shengyu zheng ）。Only a minority of migrants have a full setof these documents.The Notice of 15November does in fact separate the sheep fromthe goats by guaranteeing the rights of "good migrants".The press has also emphasizedthat the purpose of the clearance was to protect those who were in the village legallyand to get rid of those who were not，and to combat crime（5）。In this respect，the government is doing no more than governments in Europe which regularly launchcampaigns against "illegal immigrants"，except that in Peking's case the "immigrants"are Chinese citizens.According to official sources ，by 28November ，5，000people had been moved and 1，432dwellings demolished（6）。

　　But by 1December the deadline set by the Notice had passed and demolition workwas still not finished.It had even slowed down and residents had heard rumoursthat the dwellings still standing would not be demolished but taken over by theauthorities and leased back to their former occupiers.

　　Whatever the story，it is now apparent that the clearance will not be as draconianas some would have wished -for the simple reason that the four different levelsof government involved cannot agree amongst themselves.According to villagers，the representative of the Wenzhou city authorities in Peking has been trying topersuade the people in charge to go back on their decision.Unsuccessfully，asit happens，but the vice-governor of Zhejiang province is also expected in thecapital and has yet to have his say.The authorities where the migrants come fromare generally very keen for their surplus labour to go looking for work elsewhere.One Peking deputy mayor officially deplored the fact that some provincial authoritiesactually state in their Plan the number of people surplus to their local employmentrequirements and what steps they are taking to encourage them to leave（7）。

　　Concern is especially high in Wenzhou where the authorities ，according toone source，have lent large sums of moneys ，（a total of 50million yuan，bysome estimates）to locals hoping to set themselves up in Peking，and are now worriedabout recovering the money if people are expelled or not allowed to work.

　　At the other end of the trail ，the local authorities in the Peking area areall too ready to tolerate the new arrivals as long as it is to their advantage.So opposition to the migrants is in fact restricted to the two higher levels ofgoverment -the Peking municipal authorities and the central government.In theannals of the reform years，1995will no doubt go down as the year in which thecentral government tried，systematically ，to regain control of lower levels ofgovernment.The purge and reorganisation of the Peking municipal government is onestriking example of this resolve（8）。

　　At a national level meeting convened by the State authorities to address theproblems caused by the capital's floating population，the vice-premier ，Wu Bangguo，stated that if something was not done about the chaotic situation ，social stabilityand socialist modernisation would be put at risk（9）。At the municipal levelin Peking ，the committment to reimposing law and order came in the shape of new，permanent bodies specifically set up at all three levels of local government -city，ward，and district -to deal with the migrant population.

　　In addition ，a command group for migrant population affairs was set up withthe first deputy mayor as its head，seconded by a deputy mayor ，Meng Xuenong（10）。The latter is in fact the man in charge，in his capacity as head of theMigrant Office（wailai renkou guanli bangongshi ）（11）。Actual supervision onthe ground is carried out by the recently established Migrant Administration Service（wailai renkou guanlichu ）of the city's Public Security Bureau.

　　But for all this impressive bureaucratic machinery，the municipality -chronicallypowerless since the purge of its leadership （12）-was not behind the plan todemolish Zhejiang Village.The initiative came from the very highest level，fromLi Peng himself.Here is what happened：a reporter from the Zhongguo qingnian baohad gone to the Village to investigate；in his unpublished report（neican）heasserted that 700firearms were being kept there and that 2，000drug addicts anddrug dealers were living there permanently.The village was described as a hotbedof serious crime.The report was read by the prime minister who announced on 29September that "the situation has reached a point where not doing anything aboutit is no longer possible"and gave the order to clear up the district （13）。Thereupona squad of more than 2，000personnel was set up to bring Dahongmen back into thefold in the manner prescribed by the Notice of 15November quoted above.

　　The Tian'anmen syndrome

　　It would be premature to speculate on the final outcome of the current clearancecampaign and whether it will go any further than demolition and repression.（Othermigrant ghettos ，with the exception of Xinjiang Village ，excluded by virtueof government policy towards the national minorities，could well be affected.）Right now ，the way in which the decision to clear up the Village was taken israther like the way the authorities gave the order to "clear up"Tian'anmen in 1989：a period of inaction （two months in the case of the massacre，several yearsin the case of Zhejiang Village ）in which the government did virtually nothing，has been followed by what looks like a sudden fit of rage and a knee-jerk decisionto solve the problem by force.The total inflexibility of this kind of responseis hardly conducive to finding a long-term solution to these problems.

　　In the same way ，by declaring that the contracts signed by the villages areillegal ，the municipal government of Peking has shown just how little legal protectionordinary citizens enjoy in their dealings with the authorities.Article 8of theclearance Notice decrees that all land leases signed with village authorities andproduction teams in Dahongmen are illegal and invalid.But the local officials whosigned these contracts are not being punished ；the only victims of this decisionare the tenants ，who have to knock down the houses they built on these lots.Furthermore，Article 7of the Notice stipulates that "It is prohibited for migrants to use pedicabsto provide public transport services.Vehicles of violators of this ordinance willbe confiscated and their owners will be punished as prescribed by the law."Yetthese vehicles，painted in the same dark red as the Wenzhou duck meat sold in themarket，stay within the village and operate quite legally -they all bear a licenceplate issued by the local police station，and which had to be paid for.

　　But the Notice does have its positive side in as much as it does allow migrantswithout the necessary residence papers or licences to apply for them，once theyhave paid a fine，and as long as they are eligible -a procedure Meng Xuenong describesas "bringing the floating population back on to the rails of legal administration"（14）。The crux of the matter is whether the criteria used to determine eligibilityare objective ones and whether the officials who issue the papers are corrupt ornot.Chinese investigators in this field believe that up to now the floating populationhas been pushed into breaking the law by the excessive demands of officials in thevarious departments involved.

　　No one would dispute the authorities'prerogative to ensure that law and orderprevail within the migrant districts（as elsewhere）and that the influx of newcomersdoes not work to the detriment of the local population.Conversely，protectingmigrants against theft and protection rackets ，which keep one third of migrantbusinesses in the red ，is also a concern of the local authorities ，as indeedthey have affirmed（15）。

　　But when repression is seen as the only option，it is necessarily as inhumanas it is ineffective.In all probability the migrants ，good and bad ，will simplymove a bit further out，away from the city ，where they will have no difficultyfinding local peasants who will gladly rent their shacks to them for hard cash andlocal authorities all too happy to see their revenues boosted by this windfall.

　　Some will even drift back to Zhejiang Village once the campaign has lost someof its momentum ，as it almost certainly will -the Peking city authorities cannotkeep 2，000of its personnel on full alert indefinitely to keep Dahongmen undersurveillance.

　　Whatever the problems which come in its wake，the migration of rural workersto the cities is an important constituant of China's modernisation：it frees thecountryside from its burden of surplus labour and at the same time supplies thecities with workers for the physically demanding，low paid jobs available there，especially in the construction industry ，commerce and services.Meng Xuenong emphasizesthat all Peking residents ，permanent residents or migrants，are Chinese citizensand "have a right to live a worthy and civilised life."（16）。

　　If what Meng preaches is to become practice ，the authorities need to createthe conditions which will facilitate the integration of migrant workers and theirfamilies.This can only be done if the relations between legalised，tax-paying ，migrant citizens and public-minded officialdom are put on a new footing.One ofthe major factors behind the current clampdown has certainly been tax evasion ，widely practised by migrants and frequently taking the form of armed resistanceto the city's tax collectors.An indignant Meng Xueyong pointed out that revenuefrom businesses in Dahongmen plummeted from 6million yuan in 1994to 1millionyuan in 1995-ample evidence of the magnitude of the problem （17）。But if migrantsare going to become taxpayers and registered traders，they must also be able toenjoy the public services available to other citizens -which is not the case atthe moment.While schooling is theoretically free ，Wenzhou migrants have to paybetween 1000-1500yuan per year plus a substantial bribe to the officials involvedto get a place for their children.This being the case，the deputy mayor is hardlyjustified in decrying the poor "quality"（suzhi ）of the migrant population（18）。

　　As it is，the municipal authorities are not overly optimistic about their chancesof reducing the influx.The short-term aim is to cut back the migrant populationby about 10%（19）by getting rid of drifters ，criminal elements，and violatorsof the family planning regulations（20），and at the same time ，thin out "excessiveconcentrations"（guo yu jizhong）of migrants，just as many cities in Europe havebeen trying to do with their immigrant population.While the regulation and legalisationof the migrant population is not an unreasonable aim，the question which needsto be asked is whether the municipality can achieve it by demolishing people's homesheedless of the consequences to the people made homeless as a result.If the authoritiesfail to implement a properly thought-out integration policy and continue to fallback on repression，migrants will simply find other ways of keeping out of harm'sway -and the same problems will crop up，again，just a little further out fromthe city.n

　　1.Liaowang ，No.48，1995，p.17.

　　2.Interview with Wang Chunguang，October 1995.

　　3.See South China Morning Post ，29/11/1995.

　　4.Liaowang ，op.cit……，p.18.

　　5.See articles of Beijing ribao and Beijing qingnian bao quoted in XianggangLianhe Bao，29/11/1995.

　　6.See South China Morning Post ，29/11/1995.

　　7.See "Strengthen the regulated administration of migrant labour and concentrationsof migrant labour.Interview with Meng Xuenong，a deputy mayor of Peking and chairmanof the command group for the administration of migrant labour"，Liaowang No.48，p.25.Other information from direct contacts.

　　8.Interestingly，the central government's control over the Peking municipalauthorities is not restricted to politics but covers urban planning as well -adecision of the State Council has given it control over the Committee for planningand development of the capital，and nominated Luo Gan，general secretary of theState Council ，as chairman.Mingbao ，18/11/1995.

　　9.Liaowang ，op.cit.，p.24.

　　10.ibid.，25.

　　11.It was Meng Xuenong whom was "interviewed"by the reporter from Liaowang；cf.note 7.

　　12.See J.P.Béja，"Main basse sur la ville"，Perspectives Chinoises ，No.28，p.4.

　　13.Information from direct contacts，confirmed by Zhongguo funu bao ，No.28，November 1995.

　　14.Liaowang，op.cit.，p.25.

　　15.ibid.，p.18.

　　16.Liaowang，"Strengthen……"，48，p.26.

　　17.ibid.，p.26.

　　18.ibid.，p.26.

　　19.In his interview，Meng Xuenong revealed that at the time of the ad hoccensus carried out on 10/11/1994，the non-resident population was 3.295million.Given that he later stated that the maximum the municipality could handle was 3million ，this would seem to indicate that he would like to see pp.24-25.

　　20.Notice of 15November ，and Liaowang ，op.cit.，p.25.

　　A Law unto Itself -Peking‘s “Zhejiang Cun”

　　Catherine Piante and Zhu Haibo

　　In the current decade ，just as in past periods when China opened up to theoutside world ，there has been a rapid increase in the mobility of people，capitaland goods.Migrants from China‘s rural areas have flocked in their hundreds ofthousands to Peking ，the most powerful and prestigious magnet in the country.

　　In the period 1978-1993，the capital‘s migrant population soared from 300，000to 1.5million，a fivefold increase.When they first started to arrive ，thenewcomers settled in“villages”along with people from the same part of China asthemselves.Springing up in Peking’s Chaoyang，Haidian，Fengtian and Shijingshandistricts ，these centres of population quickly became known by the name of theirdominant population -“Zhejiang Village”，“Henan Village ”，and“Xinjiang Village”。

　　Migrants now tend to stay longer in Peking and many want to settle there forgood.Of the total population ，55%has been there for more than six months，eventen years in some cases.They buy a house or land to build on and set up in businessin the hope of making their fortune.

　　Situated on the outskirts of the capital，the villages help to ensure the smoothrunning of the local economy.The two main activities are the distribution of freshfood products ，such as fruit，vegetables and meat，and street occupations suchas garbage collection and sorting ，and carpentry.But they are the source of numerousproblems in the everyday life of the city ，threatening security ，economic orderand the environment.

　　In the last few years ，regardless of the type of crime committed，the proportionof city-wide arrests involving provincials has gone up from 22.5%in 1990to 37.6%in 1992，with a further increase to 43%in the first quarter of 1993.In the“villages”themselves，the figure reached 70%.

　　The Zhejiang Village（Zhejiang cun），the most well-known of the migrant centres，situated in the Dahongmen area of Fengtai ，is a particularly interesting case ，with its 50，000native Pekingers and 25，000provincials ，80%of whom are fromZhejiang province.

　　The newcomers are mainly from the agricultural and mountain villages in theWenzhou region，especially the counties of Yueqing and Yongjia.Visiting the“village ”near Peking ‘s southern rail terminus leaves one with an impressionof intense activity.The traders boast that business is even better there than onWangfujing or Xidan ，the capital’s main business thoroughfares where the bigdepartment stores are located.In the middle of the “village ”，a huge coveredmarket，16，000m2in area，provides accommodation for 2，000stalls engagedin the wholesaling and retailing of the latest styles in clothing -proof that thegarment industry is a powerful driving force in the local economy.And a row ofnew shops ，their numbers written in chalk ，are an indication that expansionhas been continuous since the market opened in 1992.Everywhere there are pilesof cloth jackets，badly finished synthetic leather jackets ，and children ‘sclothes at unbeatable prices.The market is the main supplier for all retail outletsin the capital，from department stores to boutiques.Hanging up at the entranceto the main hall is a neatly written scroll listing the nine commandments to beobserved by the market supervisor ，in itself an interesting comment on the prevailingatmosphere.

　　1.The supervisor is not allowed to abuse his position to coerce traders orto take bribes.

　　2.He cannot issue a trading licence to a relative.

　　3.He must levy taxes in accordance with the official provisions.

　　4.He should treat traders from the provinces and from Peking alike.

　　5.He does not have the right to protect a trader who has committed an offense.

　　6.He must not under any circumstances accept goods without payment.

　　7.He is not allowed to engage in business.

　　8.The supervisor must under no cicumstances appropriate for his own use a finein cash or in kind.

　　9.He must not take any reprisals if he is criticised or exposed for wrongdoing.

　　From the countless workshops on either side of the surrounding lanes，clutteredhigh with piles of discarded cloth rolls，the endless whirring of Typica and Swallowsewing machines fills the air against a constant background of Wenzhou opera musicplayed full blast on the latest stereo systems.

　　The foodstalls are piled high with dried and fresh fish ，shell fish and spices，and all manner of other produce never heard of in Peking，just in from the south.

　　The seamstresses，usually young women in their twenties，work a ten-hour dayunder a dim bulb and often sleep in the workshop as well.But for all the hardships，they still feel life is kinder to them than to their sisters doing the back-breakingfarm work back home.

　　Transportation through the“village ‘s ”lanes （hutong）comes in the shapeof bright red pedicabs brought in from Wenzhou.For the privilege of plying theirtrade in the capital，the provincials among the 300drivers who hustle for faresalong the main thoroughfare ，pay an annual fee of 210yuan，against 110yuanfor locals.

　　The traders who have been in the capital for several years already are now extremelywell-off，with a standard of living in sharp contrast to that of the latest arrivals.But the migrants keep in close touch with their relatives in the south and can callthem directly from any of the “village ‘s ”numerous street phones.

　　Most inhabitants have a temporary residence permit（linshi hukou）for whichthey make regular renewal payments.This semi-illegality is not a problem thesedays -in the “village ”，cash rules.Strictly speaking，even local schoolsare not allowed to take the children of migrants，but do so if the parents paya surcharge of 70yuan over the school fees paid by local parents.

　　The district appears to be not entirely under the control of the city authorities，but organised more along Mafia lines.Each year large sums of money are paid bythe village to the local authorities and to local residents ，who turn a blindeye to the rising migrant flood and the illegal goings-on ，their fear of increasingcrime taking second place to the baser instinct of greed.

　　According to a local workshop owner married to a Wenzhou girl and employer offour seamstresses ，the payment made to the local authorities in return for tacitlyallowing residents from Zhejiang to rent land and property is shared out among the“village ‘s ”Peking residents，at an estimated 5，000yuan per family per year.

　　The high cost of securing its right to exist in this legal twilight zone andto run its own affairs has given the“village ”its own power structure.The settlementis divided into four districts-cum-village -Dengcun，Macun，Shicun and Houcun，with villagers living in one or the other according to their place of origin（guxiang）。Each village is run by a village boss whom everybody calls the dragon ‘s head（long tou），a striking and revealing term which in the south of the country isthe name traditionally given to triad big shots.

　　The village hierarchy is based on seniority -power is in the hands of the firstsettlers.Village chiefs have to be clan members of their native village，and rich.Members of the Mafia-style organisation in the village usually come from the mountainregions of Wenzhou，and are often recently released convicts ，or wanted by thepolice at home，petty criminals or failed businessmen who want to start again，or nouveaux riches who want protection from some other rival clan muscling in ontheir manor.The secret organisations grew along with the growth of the “village”，and while they have some points in common ，they are otherwise unconnectedwith the notorious Wenzhou triads.

　　Now that the writ of the district committees（juweihui）no longer runs ，crimehas become the major problem in the “village ”。According to the local policestation （paichusuo ），provincials，who account for 80%of the assaults committedin the village，show little hesitation now in taking on the Peking native residents.Their only recourse ，one of them told the writers ，is to get a few soldiersin to impose order，but they are reluctant to get involved unless the money isworthwhile.

　　Cases of theft，rape ，brawling ，kidnapping and assaults on taxi driversin which other Zhejiang residents are the victims are even more common than casesinvolving Peking people.Theft is about the only way jobless newcomers can survive.“Steal a million and spend the Spring Festival at home ”（qiangjie yi baiwan，hui jia guo chunjie ）was one telling saying doing the rounds in “Zhejiang village”，just before the festival this year [1993].

　　Settling scores with knives ，pistols，and even shotguns happens all the time，say residents.Billiard games often end in violence when the loser cannot pay theimpossible sums he has bet on the outcome.Occasionally the clans bring in“hiredhands ”from the North East for the dirtier jobs.Sometimes even the families backhome become embroiled in the gang rivalries taking place in the capital.

　　More troubling still is the rise of organised crime -prostitution，gambling，unregistered businesses ，and tax fraud.One third of the businesses in the“village”are unregistered.In 1992，unpaid tax to the tune of 2.4million yuan was recoveredafter a crackdown on 3，000businesses.Opposition to the authorities is becomingmore and more violent and organised as Public Treasury vehicles are vandalised andtax inspectors beaten up.

　　In an attempt to combat this crime wave which ，as they have realised，cannotbe stemmed from the outside ，the local authorities have given their tacit supportto inter-communal “local collective defense squads ”（difang lianfangdui）。Theirjob is to keep order and protect the interests of residents （tongxiang ）livingunder a long tou，but the way they operate is distinctly Mafia-like -residentswho require their services have to pay a so-called“security fee”（zhi ‘an fei）of not less than 300-500yuan for each round.

　　The “Zhejiang village”is a striking example of how shady，feudalistic organisationscan proliferate on the outskirts of a city in areas abandoned to their fate by aweakened central authority.As such ，it is one indication of the failure of governmentpolicy to contain the rural exodus.n

　　Trouble at Zhejiang Village

　　Fazhi wencui bao，31March 1994（1）

　　“To all traders；we ask you to go back to work straightaway and continue workingas usual to avoid creating any misunderstanding among the public.Those of you whowould like to air your problems at the office are welcome to do so.That way wecan improve the management of the market in all its aspects ”。

　　This notice was posted up in the Muxi Yuan（Osmanthus Gardens ）wholesale marketfor light industrial items in Fengtai district.From 1to 7March the more than500traders ，who had moved in just after the Chinese New Year ，had gone on strike.On 7March，the day I arrived to carry out my investigation，the market ‘s loudspeakerswere endlessly broadcasting the same message encouraging traders to go back to work.Once a bustling scene busy with supplying and selling goods ，the market now lookedcompletely different -stalls were closed up and their owners were aimlessly walkingaround at the entrance.On the west side of the market traders had put up a jointlywritten “urgent notice ”，the“notices ”on the east side of the market had beenput up by the office of Industry and Commerce.On the small square at the entranceto the market ，uniformed officials from the Office and police with electric batonswere walking to and fro.

　　The Office，which runs the market，is on the east side.Following the directionsgiven to me by the police ，I found it and was given the background to the strikeby the person in charge ，Zhao Qing.“The market was set up a little over a yearago.There have been problems with maintaining order ever since.Fights are alwaysbreaking out.To make it easier to keep order ，we decided to introduce registrationcards for all traders ，for security ‘s sake.We began letting people know on20February ，but so far very few have come forward of their own initiative.On1March ，we carried out strict identity checks and stopped anyone without a permitfrom entering the market.Finally ，egged on by a minority ，all the traders stoppedwork on the pretext that the licence fee for stall space was too high.Then sometraders put up posters with the words ：”Firmly oppose excessive taxation and unjustifiedfines “and ”the Office of Industry and Commerce is responsible for what happenedon 1March“。For several days now we have been trying to persuade people to goback to work by putting up posters and using the loudspeakers ，but as they arebeing manipulated by a minority ，the strike has gone on right up to today ”。

　　More than a year ago the Office signed an agreement with its equivalent in Wenzhouand with the Peking Liaison office of the mayor of Wenzhou as well as with the Officeof Industry and Commerce of Dongqing and Yongjia districts in Zhejiang province.This provided for the construction of the “Peking Wenzhou light industry wholesalemarket”and the “Peking -Wenzhou Tower ”，with a floor area of 25，000m2，tobe collectively financed by the Wenzhou traders in Zhejiang Village.Each traderwas to contribute 13，000yuan，with the prospect of recovering his stake by rentingstall space and facilities for a four-year period.There was a preferential treatmentclause which provided ，among other things ，for each trader to be allocated fivesquare metres of space for which he would pay rent at the rate of 60yuan per month（to remain unchanged for a period of two years ）。In the first half-year afteropening traders would enjoy a 50%reduction in charges and others advantages.Morethan one thousand traders in the Village were attracted by these preferential termsand collected a total of more than 20million yuan to invest in the project.WhenI left the Office I was surrounded by a group of Wenzhou traders who，on the pretextof showing me how to get to the Peking liaison office of Liqing district，tookme off to a restaurant to explain the situation.“All of us ，together ，decidedto go on strike of our own accord ，but we were forced into it by the Office.Theythink that we Wenzhou people are just here to be milked dry.They have not respectedthe joint agreement setting up the market ，and charges are going up all the time.Under the terms of the agreement，a trader who wanted to set up in the temporarymarket which he himself had helped pay for，would only have to pay 30yuan a monthfor a year for this stall space and would have no taxes to pay.But as soon as wemoved in，they ignored the agreement and started charging us for water and electricity，security and cleaning and the rates ，and they kept on putting up the fee for stallspace as well.The Office puts up one notice one day，then the next it puts upanother ，saying something completely different.In 1992，when the market opened，monthly rent was 30yuan.In January 1993，it went up to 45yuan and then furtherincreased to 55yuan in November.At the end of the same year they put up a noticeannouncing they would be levying a management fee as well ，plus the usual 75yuanper month per stall.These endless increases with apparently no upper limit -andall being made in violation of the contract has been a cause of intense dissatisfactionamong small traders like ourselves，especially as there is no way we can pay them.Last year many of us hardly made anything anyway.If we are going to have to payhundreds of yuan，we will all go bankrupt.But if we don ‘t pay up，the Officefines us，closes down our stalls ，seizes our goods or even tries to scare usby sending in the police with their electric batons.If things go on like this，we just can ’t go on working.This seven-day strike is for the future of our 1，500shop spaces in the Peking-Wenzhou Tower.In October [1994]we are supposed tomove into our new premises but as the Office is already exploiting Zhejiang peoplein these rudimentary premises we now occupy ，we know what to expect once we havemoved into the new market.

　　My contact in the Peking liaison office of Liqing district told me that the500plus traders operating in the market have now all reopened their stalls andthat their representatives have taken down the slogans.

　　Will things settle down ，now that the strike is over？Can the problem overrent for stall space be settled reasonably？There is a great deal of anxiety aboutthis，both at the Office for Industry and Commerce ，which controls access tothe market，and among the traders who work inside.n

　　1.Based on an article by Chen Xieheng in Zhongguo shangbao （China BusinessNews），23March 1994.

　　Communities of“Provincials ”in the Large Cities ：Conflicts and Integration

　　Wang Chunguang

　　In this article the term“provincials ”will be used to qualify all those individualswho do not have the status of city residents，and in particular the rural peoplewho go to the city as workers or tradesmen.Seen in terms of the registry systemand the organisation by status which is prevalent in China，these individuals arenot city residents，even though their working and living environment is in thecity，thus they are often considered “marginal”or“provincial”。After launchingits policy for reform and opening in 1978，the Chinese government relaxed controlon migration towards the cities.Drawn by the prospect of considerable profits，a large number of rural people flooded into the cities，especially the large ones，in search of employment and money-making opportunities.Up to now these rural people，who number hundreds of thousands in every big city，have grouped together in specificareas of the metropolis ，forming“urban villages”：in Peking these have namessuch as Hebei town，the Sichuanese village ，Anhui Maids‘village ，Xinjiangvillage and Zhejiang village；in Canton there is Hunan village ，the Sichuanesevillage ，and Jiangxi village.The main characteristics of these “villages”arethose of any community：a well-defined territory ，a self-directed system of appropriateservices and a specific network of social relations.For these reasons，we willrefer to these“villages”as“provincial communities”。

　　We have maintained close contacts over a lengthy period of time with Zhejiangvillage ，a well-established provincial community south of Peking，which has developedin a typical way.From our field surveys，we have gathered a large amount of first-handmaterial，making it possible to examine relational problems that arise when provincialcommunities adapt to the surrounding urban environment and set up internal self-regulation.

　　Zhejiang village is situated six or seven kilometres south of Tian‘anmen inPeking.It is already a suburban area ，south of the southern sector of the thirdring road.Apart from a few buildings and chimneys suggesting the presence of factories，most of the lodgings are low，uncomfortable houses with square courtyards.Originally，the owners themselves also had the status of peasants ，but，to answer the needfor industrial development and urban construction ，the State recruited them asworkers or political cadres and accorded them the material and social advantagesof urban workers（rights which peasants were deprived of）。Most of these peopleare lodged in low-rent collective housing and rent out the private houses they havevacated to peasants from Zhejiang who come to the city as workers or tradesmen.This is why this particular area has become the gathering place in Peking for peasantsfrom Zhejiang.Their total number is probably about 80，000individuals representingaround thirty villages.We have discovered that this sort of provincial communityis by no means a poverty area ，since many of its members have annual incomes ofmore than 10，000yuan and their level of spending for food and clothing is higherthan that of many middle-class Peking residents.At the same time ，this communityis different from the “Chinatowns”of Western countries，in that there are noproblems of differences between ethnic groups or nationalities；the only differencesare between provinces and dialects.National identity is the same as that of thecity residents，even if the community is not totally integrated into urban society.

　　In order for these provincial communities to exist and to be accepted by thecity，it is essential that their respective roles complement and reinforce oneanother.From this point of view，the highly centralised system of planning was，for a long time ，a stumbling block to meeting the basic social needs of city people，because it practised a policy proclaiming “the primacy of production over dailylife”or“the unification of distribution ，buying and selling ”。By reducingsystematic control of the State over society，the policy of reform and openingallowed different life styles to flourish ，creating daily needs which had longbeen repressed for city residents.Nevertheless ，on account of their rather irrationalstructure and their low productivity，city firms found themselves momentarily incapableof satisfactorily meeting demands and fulfilling the citizens ‘daily requirements.As a result ，Peking suffered a serious shortage of clothes and hairdressers fora time，and to some extent ，a shortage of food.This is what made the city openits doors to the rural population.It was their presence，in fact，that solvedcertain difficulties of daily life in the city：the rural people enriched the urbaneconomy ，provided city residents with much-needed services，and all the while，of course ，they were taking away much higher earnings than they could have gainedthrough agricultural work at home.This is precisely the type of situation，characterisedby the drive to make a profit and by complementary needs，which favoured the origin，the development and the continuation of Zhejiang village.

　　The “immigrants”：necessary but insecure

　　The inhabitants of Zhejiang village are mainly craftsmen and small businessmenwho are involved in producing and selling crafts and clothing.Our survey revealedthat on the Peking market today ，more than 90%of down-filled ，winter ，andleather clothing are produced by the village，which also provides the residentsof Peking with many other small consumer items.What is more，the inhabitants ofthe village provide the city‘s coffers with an additional annual income of nearly100million yuan，while at the same time assuring substantial revenue for the localurban population in the form of rents.This is why people in Peking ，includingsome local government officers，demonstrated their displeasure when，in 1989，the city sent in armoured vehicles to disperse the village.Obviously ，becausethey control an essential part of the Peking market for clothing and small consumeritems ，the residents of the village have certain advantages in the fields of transportand information which are inherent to the workings of the big city market and itsextensions.As a result ，their commercial outlets extend to all parts of the country-particularly the North -and even abroad -the former Soviet Union，for example-and their profits are sizeable.It is precisely because of this race for profitsthat provincial communities can be accepted by the city and survive there.

　　Nevertheless，the adaptation or integration of these communities to urban societystops there ，and no statutory procedure exists that allows them to be assimilatedby this society.We feel that without institutional changes ，any formal socialintegration remains incomplete，unstable ，irrational ，and therefore fragile.With the survey on Zhejiang village we have found that present urban regulationhas had absolutely no impact on the provincial community；in other words ，noset of regulations has been drafted which might legalise it.

　　First of all，as we have said，these provincial people are neither coverednor even recognised by the city registration system ，and as a result，they cannotbenefit from the various rights granted to city residents by the municipal authoritiesand their organisations.On the other hand，in principle ，they are under no obligationto perform any duties.

　　Next，according to the Chinese administrative code ，the local authoritiesonly administer and protect those individuals who are registered.As a result ，they have no authority to supervise ，in an organised and systematic way ，thosepeople who，like the provincials in the cities ，are not listed on the city registers.Therefore ，the administration does not give provincials the same treatment itaccords city residents，and is quite happy to collect their money and levy manykinds of special taxes under different pretexts （many provincials have to pay severaldozen different taxes ）。On the other hand，the administration rarely gives themconsideration and protection in return.

　　A third point ，on the statutory level ，is that cities also limit the extentto which the provincials‘activities are legalised.For example ，if they are goingto register with the administration in charge of crafts and trade to obtain an operatinglicence ，they must first complete the formalities for a temporary city resident’s card，for rents，or for attestations authorising them to come from outsideand exercise a profession or open a business.On top of this，they have to payall the administrative costs and even bribe the employees concerned ；at the endof the day，the cost of these licences is much too high.As all this is the causeof much vexation，many provincials turn to “moonlighting”because they do notwant their work to be of an official nature.The result is that provincial communitiesare inclined to participate on a large scale in the black economy -which we couldjust as accurately define as illegal economic activities.

　　A fourth point：regulations prevent provincial communities from embarking onthe path of “auto-organisation ”。Not only are they lacking administrative bodiesand services of their own ，comparable to those of the urban sectors -such ascommunal administration or neighbourhood committees -but they have not even formedany sort of intermediary organisation.This is why，even if they are grouped together，even if they help one another and there is much exchange between them ，the provincialsare virtually unprotected by any organisation and find themselves in a situationcharacterised by its lack of order and cohesion due to the absence of authorityand administrative management.

　　At the same time，because provincials and city residents are organised accordingto social status，tensions -even contradictions -do exist between the two groups.Although the city residents are fully aware of the daily benefits the provincialsprovide for them，they are suspicious，and even tend to scorn them and hold themresponsible for the numerous problems which have appeared in their city.Thus ，the people of Peking often reproach the provincials for social insecurity in theircity，traffic jams ，problems of hygiene，etc.On the other side ，the provincialsalso have preconceived ideas about city residents.This is why exchanges betweenresidents of Zhejiang village and Peking are mostly limited to trade，and are devoidof any deep feelings or of any reciprocal emotion or recognition.This is also whyfew close links of friendship exist between them.Amongst the people in the “village”，not one professed to have a close relationship with his landlord，which indicatesthat，for the people of Peking ，the provincial community is in no way an organisationalpart of their society and that for the provincials，Peking is not a place wherethey can express their social identity.Thus，the provincial communities have notidentified with ，or integrated into ，urban society.

　　In conclusion ，relations between provincial communities and city residentsremain at a practical level of providing material benefits，but there is no setof regulations or the slightest social recognition between them.This type of integrationis insufficient ，incomplete ，and unstable.Any effective social integrationshould achieve a high degree of unity in all areas at once：social functioning ，regulation and identification.If there is a deficiency in one area ，many difficultieswill ensue.Our survey shows that the social problems in Zhejiang village are allassociated with its lack of integration into Peking society.

　　The “village ”order

　　As a result of inadequate regulations ，the village is lacking a powerful andstructured administration.With the absence of this strong external factor for regulatingbehaviour ，not only do the residents of the village represent a provincial populationwithout supervision or protection ，but on top of this ，certain local officersin the Peking municipal administration do not consider the provincials as rightfulcitizens or as individuals they are meant to serve，and they fall into arbitrarydiscrimination and racketeering.Because of the confusion about ，or absence of，social identity ，the population in the village has no sense of belonging to Pekingsociety ，no feeling of responsibility towards it；this attitude is often betrayedby actions which are completely lacking in self-discipline.

　　This is the two-fold source of a series of social problems：a kind of socialanarchy ，the disappearance of standards of behavior ，the appearance of tensionsand conflicts.In the absence of efficient organisation ，regulation and management，public order in the village is especially precarious.If a case of swindling orracketeering，armed robbery or brawling breaks out ，the Public Security is powerless，either due to lack of means ，or else because of the inertia of the system ，for，in accordance with Chinese regulations，its priority is to supervise those citizenswho are registered under its jurisdiction and it considers the supervision of theprovincials as an additional task whose implementation -or not -has no influenceon the evaluation of its work.Administrative anarchy also favours the growth ofcorruption.Some tax officers ，employees，officers of the public security orthe defence forces，make use of a double flaw：1）the fact that the State hasissued no standard regulations concerning the provincials ，and 2）the fact thatthe majority of independent craftsmen from Zhejiang are not registered.So，thesepeople fill their pockets ，even resorting to swindling and racketeering ，whichsometimes leads to conflicts with the residents of the village.What is more，atanother level ，these corrupt civil servants undermine the impact which the applicationof the law could have ，for many of the victims do not receive effective legalprotection.On the other hand ，with the help of a few bribes，the culprits aresubmitted to a very liberal law ，full of clemency and pardons.

　　The appearance of provincial communities is ，in fact，the rural people ‘s answer to these problems.Planted in the city ，without being effectively integratedand protected there ，they organise their own forces.This is why integration ofthe provincial community is so important for the people and for the community itself.Today ，these communities in Chinese cities generally are all made up of individualsfrom the same town，the same region or the same province ，which has led to theappearance of many urban provincial communities carrying the name of a province（or a region ）。Thus ，the peasants of Sichuan province gathered in Peking toform a Sichuanese village ，and Zhejiang village is likewise made up of peasantsfrom Zhejiang.The rural areas in China and the favouring local solidarity，kinship，and marriage ties.And so ，unconsciously，they transpose this tradition to thecity，considering these ties to be the emotional mainstay and the principal foundationfor mutual aid and support within the framework of their own urban lives.Zhejiangvillage has ，in fact，been inserted into a network of parental relationshipsand social identities which closely intertwines kinship ，marriage and local solidarity.This sort of traditional network of relationships presents several advantages inthe eyes of the provincials ：first，it is pre-established and can therefore beused as wished，without requiring the least investment or initiation ；second ，it is tight-knit and reliable ，and does not present a great risk.This is whyeach and every member of the village falls back on this network ，thereby bringingtogether ordinary members of the family and close friends.

　　Viewed from the inside，the village is again divided into small living unitsstructured according to well-defined links of local solidarity，with the peoplefrom the same district living together，and likewise those from the same county，town，or village.Intimate friends ，of course，maintain close ties.This wayof organising the habitat makes it possible to have the support of close friendsin order to face possible difficulties，exchange commercial information which maybe useful for work，and maintain the local habits and life style.It also helpsin making new acquaintances who can share feelings and confidences.This type oforganisation is especially apparent in the area of mutual services.As the residentsof the village are many ，Peking society is incapable of systematically providingthem with the basic services necessary for every-day life ，so they are reducedto counting on volunteers to set up community services such as hairdressing ，food，health care ，youth education，supplies of vegetables ，transports ，and evencultural and leisure activities.Today，life inside the village is no longer asuncomfortable as it once was and provides many more facilities than other areasof Peking ，since its residents can still enjoy the life style of their regionof origin.

　　Provincial communities such as Zhejiang village could only spring up and thrivethanks to a process of auto-integration carried out along two lines ：a strongsocial identity ，on the one hand，and reciprocal advantage and mutual support，on the other.In other words，assimilation within the village is dependent mainlyon social identity and a working mutual support system that is highly personal，but that has no strong constraints or no objective criteria for judging behaviour.On the one hand ，this sort of integration encourages Zhejiang village and otherprovincial communities to maintain strong feelings of hostility towards outsideelements，which re-enforces their non adaptation to urban life ；this makes itdifficult for outside forces to penetrate ，and means that ，in managing theseareas ，the municipal administrative bodies face incidents of gang resistance andhostility.On the other hand，integration within the community is precarious.Socialidentity is reduced only to local solidarity，parental and marriage ties ，andit is destabilised by the introduction of economic interests：at times everyoneis united in resisting outside pressure and interference，at other times the communitysplits up into different groups ，or gangs according to district ，county ，townor village of origin，and the quarrels can degenerate into fights and assassinations.The so-called Wuzhong gang，the Shangtang gang ，the Qingjiang gang ，or theDajing gang are the best examples of this in Zhejiang village ，for the divisionsoperate according to the different towns in the prefecture of Wenzhou in Zhejiangprovince（Wuzhong ，Shangtang，Qingjiang and Dajing ）。Conflicts are frequentamongst these groups，which clearly destabilises the village.

　　The “provincials ”：towards assimilation or marginalisation？

　　Provincial communities have now put down roots in Chinese cities.Their sizeis not negligible ，they organise a definite network of relations and they representa certain mode of integration.If the large cities do not assimilate them completely，and as quickly as possible，by granting them similar treatment to that of the otherareas ，these communities will ，in the long term ，dissociate themselves fromthe city，which will no longer be able to do anything with them，and they could，in turn ，provoke violent urban disorder.Considering the basic living conditionsof these provincial communities are poor，we can predict that a good number ofthe provincials who have become wealthy will voluntarily abandon the community，either because they expect，with their “compatriots ”to find other outlets ，or else because they hope to get ahead by moving to other areas.The provincialswho stay will be incapable of earning any money ，but，having lost their ruralidentity，they will no longer want to return to agricultural work.Thus，it isquite possible that these communities of provincials will follow the path to impoverishmentand will make up the destitute areas of the cities.This can leave neither the municipalauthorities ，nor the town planning specialists indifferent.n

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